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Abstract
In this paper we explore the relation between three areas: judg-
ment aggregation, belief merging and social choice theory. Judgment
aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logi-
cally interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same
propositions. When majority voting is applied to some propositions
(the premises) it may however give a different outcome than majority
voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). Starting
from this so-called doctrinal paradox, the paper surveys the literature
on judgment aggregation (and its relation to preference aggregation),
and shows that the application of a well known belief merging opera-
tor can dissolve the paradox. Finally, the use of distances is shown to
establish a link between belief merging and preference aggregation in
social choice theory.
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1 Introduction
Social choice theory (Arrow 1963, Arrow et al. 2002, Sen 1970) studies the
aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a collectively preferred
alternative. Way back in 1770, the Marquis de Condorcet proposed a method
for the aggregation of preferences which led to the first aggregation problem:
the voting paradox. Given a set of individual preferences, we compare each of
the alternatives in pairs. For each pair we determine the winner by majority
voting, and the final social ordering is obtained by a combination of all partial
results. The paradoxical result is that the pairwise majority rule can lead to
cycles.
More recently, scholars in law and social choice theorists have become
interested in other aggregation problems like the doctrinal paradox (or dis-
cursive dilemma).1 It has been shown that the discursive dilemma is a gener-
alization of the paradox of voting (List and Pettit 2002). However, unlike the
voting paradox, the doctrinal paradox arises when the members of a group
have to make a judgment (in the form of yes or no) on specific proposi-
tions rather than express preferences among candidates. A possibility result
(Pigozzi 2004) is obtained when an operator defined in artificial intelligence
to merge knowledge bases is applied to the doctrinal paradox.
This paper surveys the literature on judgment aggregation, summarizes
the results obtained when a distance-based merging operator is applied to the
discursive dilemma, and establishes the link to distance-based approaches in
social choice theory. Section 2 provides an example of the doctrinal paradox.
Section 3 summarizes the major results on the relation between judgment ag-
gregation and preference aggregation. Section 4 illustrates how the doctrinal
paradox dissolves when a well known majority merging operator is imported
into judgment aggregation. Section 5 establishes some links to distance-based
approaches in social choice theory.
2 The doctrinal paradox
The doctrinal paradox can emerge when the members of a group have to
make a judgment (in the form of yes or no) on several logically intercon-
nected propositions, and the individually logically consistent judgments need
to be combined into a collective decision. For example, consider a set of
propositions, where some (the ‘premises’) are taken to be equivalent to an-
other proposition (the ‘conclusion’). When majority voting is applied to the
1For a comprehensive bibliography of the rapidly growing body of literature on the
doctrinal paradox, see List (2005).
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premises it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to the
conclusion. This phenomenon did first draw the attention of researchers in
law (Kornhauser 1992, Kornhauser and Sager 1986, 1993), who illustrated
the paradox with the following example. Suppose that three judges have to
decide whether a defendant is liable for breaching a contract. According to
the legal doctrine, a person is liable of a certain action X (this is the propo-
sition R) if and only if the defendant performed the action X (P ) and had
contractual obligation not to do X (Q). Now assume that each judge makes
a consistent judgment over the propositions P , Q and R, as the following
table shows:
P Q R (P ∧Q)↔ R
Judge 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Judge 2 Yes No No Yes
Judge 3 No Yes No Yes
Majority Yes Yes No Yes
Each individual consistently assigns a truth value to each proposition P ,
Q and R (saying yes to R if and only if both P and Q are believed to be
true). However, if majority voting is applied only to the premises (P , Q) of
the argument (this procedure is called premise-based procedure), the result is
that there is a majority that believes both P and Q to be true (and, therefore,
because of (P ∧Q)↔ R, that majority is held to believe that R is also true).
At the same time, if majority voting is applied only to the conclusion R
(conclusion-based procedure), the majority of the group believes that R is
false, which conflicts with the aggregation of the premises.2 The paradox
lies precisely in the fact that the two procedures may lead to contradictory
results (one accepting and the other rejecting R), depending on whether the
majority is taken on the individual judgments of P and Q, or whether the
majority is calculated on the individual votes of R. The question is then
whether a collective outcome exists in these cases, and if it does, what it is
like.3
2See Pigozzi (2004) for a criticism of the premise-based procedure and the conclusion-
based procedure.
3Condorcet Jury Theorem provides an epistemic justification of majority voting. Sup-
pose that any two pairs of alternatives are given, each member of a group has a probability
greater than 0.5 to vote for the right choice and the group votes through a majority rule.
Under specific additional (independence) assumptions, the theorem states that the group’s
probability of choosing the right alternative increases with the size of the group itself and
approaches 1 in the limit. List and Goodin (2001) have generalized the Condorcet Jury
Theorem to multiple propositions.
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A possibility result (see Section 4) is obtained when a merging operator,
originally introduced in computer science to merge several finite sets of in-
formation, is imported and applied to the problem of judgment aggregation.
The justification for this move is that the theory of information merging and
group decision-making share a similar difficulty, viz. the definition of opera-
tors that produce collective knowledge from individual knowledge bases, and
operators that produce a collective decision from individual decisions.
In the next session we will mention some of the results concerning the
relation between judgment aggregation and preference aggregation.
3 Judgment and preference aggregation
Let us first introduce some terminology. Given a finite set of n individuals,
the finite set X of propositions on which the individuals have to make their
judgments is called an agenda. A (individual or collective) judgment set is
a subset A ⊆ X, where p ∈ A means that the proposition p is accepted in
A. Individual judgment sets are usually assumed to be consistent. Following
Dokow and Holzmann (2005), a judgment set can be represented by a binary
evaluation a : X → {0, 1} where, for all p ∈ X, a(p) = 1 iff p ∈ A.
A profile is a n-tuple (A1, . . . , An) of individual judgment sets. Finally,
a (judgment) aggregation rule is a function f that assigns to each profile
(A1, . . . , An) a collective judgment set f(A1, . . . , An) ⊆ X.
An impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation has been proved by
List and Pettit (2002). It says that there exists no aggregation proce-
dure (generating complete, consistent and deductively closed collective sets
of judgments) which satisfies the following conditions: universal domain,
anonymity and systematicity. Universal domain states that an aggregation
procedure accepts as admissible input any logically possible profile of indi-
vidual sets of judgments. Anonymity ensures that all individuals have equal
weight in determining the collective sets of judgments, while systematicity is
the condition requiring that the aggregation procedure treats all propositions
in an evenhanded way.
Social choice theory studies how to define a collective preference relation
from individual preference relations. Arrow’s theorem is the famous impos-
sibility theorem in social choice. Even though judgment aggregation and
preference aggregation are distinct research areas, they show some similari-
ties. As the problem of preference aggregation is illustrated by Condorcet’s
paradox, so the difficulties of judgment aggregation are illustrated by the doc-
trinal paradox. A natural question is then whether there is a relation and,
if so, of what kind, between the two problems. List and Pettit (2002) show
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that judgment aggregation is a generalization of the preference aggregation
framework.
In particular, Dietrich and List (2005) show that Arrow’s theorem (for
strict preferences) can be stated in the judgment aggregation framework, and
prove Arrow’s theorem to be a corollary of a general impossibility theorem
on judgment aggregation.
It is straight-forward to see that Condorcet’s paradox and most prefer-
ence aggregation problems can be embedded into a judgment aggregation
framework by representing preference orderings as sets of binary ranking
judgments. While preferences over some set S of alternatives are usually rep-
resented as binary relations R ⊂ S×S, they can as well be given a logical rep-
resentation by defining the agenda such that X= {(x > y)|x 6= y} is a set of
atomic preference judgments. Then, for any individual preference judgment
set A ⊆ X, any preference relation R such that {(x, y)|(x > y) ∈ A} ⊆ R
can be interpreted as a model of A.
The usual properties of preferences can be imposed with the help of pref-
erence postulates. The postulates characterizing preference judgment sets
corresponding to linear orders are given, for all distinct x, y, z ∈ S and all
A ⊆ X by:
P1: (x > y) ∈ A ∨ (y > x) ∈ A (completeness)
P2: (x > y) ∈ A→ (y > x) /∈ A (asymmetry)
P3: (x > y) ∈ A ∧ (y > z) ∈ A→ (x > z) ∈ A (transitivity) (see
Hansson 1995).
The following table lists the preference judgment sets corresponding to
the set of all linear orders on a set of three alternatives:
x > y y > x y > z z > y x > z z > x
a1 1 0 1 0 1 0
a2 0 1 1 0 0 1
a3 1 0 0 1 0 1
a4 1 0 0 1 1 0
a5 0 1 0 1 0 1
a6 0 1 1 0 1 0
The mere logical representation of preferences and the reformulation of
the problem of preference aggregation in terms of the aggregation of atomic
preference judgments and preference postulates does of course not dissolve
the paradoxes of preference aggregation, as the example of the aggregation
of three sets of preference judgments leading to the doctrinal paradox shows.
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x > y y > x y > z z > y x > z z > x P
a1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
a2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
a3 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Majority 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
(P stands for the preference postulates for linear orders)
This example of judgment aggregation corresponds to the problem of the
aggregation of three transitive preferences where the application of the ma-
jority rule leads to the familiar Condorcet paradox. Majority voting on these
propositions produces an inconsistent result, as the preference postulates for
linear orders are unanimously accepted, while the outcome under proposition
wise majority voting violates transitivity.
Fortunately the fact that preference relations are the natural models of
preference states facilitates the use of model-based merging operators, which
can be shown to dissolve judgment aggregation paradoxes (Pigozzi 2004).
This is addressed in the next section.
4 The doctrinal paradox and belief merging
Belief merging formally investigates how to aggregate a finite number of belief
bases into a collective one. Its formal framework consists of a propositional
language L which is built up from a finite set P of propositional letters
standing for atomic propositions and the usual connectives (¬, ∨, ∧, →,
↔). A belief base Ki is a consistent finite set of propositional formulas from
the agent i (and corresponds to the individual judgment set in judgment
aggregation). A belief set is a set E = {K1, K2, . . . , Kn} (what is called
a profile in judgment aggregation). Given a set of integrity constraints IC
(i.e., some extra conditions imposed on the result of the merging operator),
∆ (similarly as the aggregation rule F in the previous section) maps E and
IC into a new (collective) belief base ∆IC(E). The outcome should keep
maximal information from each Ki. This is achieved using a distance-based
approach such that the total distance between the individual bases and the
collective outcome is minimized. In a model-based framework the models of
∆IC(E) are models of IC that differ minimally from the models of each Ki.
An interpretation is a function P → {0, 1}. Let W = {0, 1}P denote the
set of all interpretations. For any formula ϕ ∈ L, [ϕ] = {ω ∈ W|ω |= ϕ}
denotes the set of models of ϕ, i.e. the set of interpretations which validate
ϕ in the usual classical truth functional way.4 Conversely, for any set of
4If a formula ϕ is validated by exactly one model ω ∈ W the latter will be written ωϕ.
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modelsM ⊂ W let form(M) denote the propositional formula (up to logical
equivalence) such that [form(M)] =M , i.e. the formula the models of which
are precisely M . A belief base Ki is a finite set of propositional formulae
which will be identified with the conjunction of its elements. Denote by K
the set of all consistent belief bases. (It is usually assumed that belief bases
are consistent.)
In a model-based framework a merging operator (with integrity constraint
IC ∈ K) ∆IC : Kn → K is defined by a correspondence mIC : Kn → [IC] ⊂
W from the set of all possible profiles of belief bases to the set of all models
of IC such that for all K ∈ Kn, ∆IC(K) = form(mIC(K)).5
Most model-based merging operators mIC : Kn → [IC] ⊂ W are based
on the selection of the interpretation(s) that minimize(s) distance to the
collection of sets of models {[K1], [K2], ..., [Kn]} corresponding to a profile
K = (K1, K2, ..., Kn) ∈ Kn of belief bases.
A distance between interpretations is a function d : W ×W → R+ such
that for all ω, ω′ ∈ W :
1. d(ω, ω′) = d(ω′, ω)
2. d(ω, ω′) = 0 iff ω = ω′.
For any interpretation ω ∈ W and any belief base K ∈ K, let d(ω,K) =
minω′∈[K] d(ω, ω′), i.e. the distance between an interpretation and a belief
base is the minimal distance over the models of the latter.
For any interpretation ω ∈ W and any profile of belief bases K ∈ Kn
the distance between an interpretation and a profile can now be defined
with the help of an aggregation function D : Rn+ → R+ as Dd(ω,K) =
D (d(ω,K1), d(ω,K2), ..., d(ω,Kn)) (Konieczny, Lang and Marquis 2004). Any
such aggregation function gives rise to a total pre-order 6K of the set W
of all interpretations with respect to their distance to a given profile of
belief bases. Thus the merging operator defined for every K ∈ Kn by
mIC(K) = min([IC],6K) selects the set of all interpretations with minimal
distance to the profile of belief bases.
Obviously, the properties of the merging operator essentially depend on
the distance functions d and D. However, no specific characterization results
are available to evaluate the appropriateness of a given merging operator for
a given aggregation problem.
The most widely used merging operator in the belief merging literature
is the operator denoted by ∆d,Σ, where:
5For reasons of convenience, a merging operator ∆ : Kn → K will be identified in the
following with the correspondence m : Kn →W that defines it.
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1. d is the Hamming distance, which is defined by the number of proposi-
tional letters on which two interpretations differ, or, formally, d(ω, ω′) =
|{pi ∈ P|ω(pi) 6= ω′(pi)}|, and where
2. Dd(ω,K) =
∑
i
d(ω,Ki) is the sum of componentwise Hamming dis-
tances.6
In the original example of the doctrinal paradox, all three judges agree
that a person is liable (R) only if he did a certain action X (P ) and had
contractual obligation not to do X (Q); that is they accept (P ∧ Q) ↔ R.
Therefore E = {K1, K2, K3} and IC = {(P ∧ Q) ↔ R}. Each judge makes
a judgment on P , Q and R that satisfies the integrity constraint. The three
belief bases are:
K1 = {P,Q,R}
K2 = {P,¬Q,¬R}
K3 = {¬P,Q,¬R}
with corresponding interpretations {(1, 1, 1)}, {(1, 0, 0)} and {(0, 1, 0)}.
The table below shows the result of the IC majority merging operator
on E = {K1, K2, K3}. The first column lists all the consistent evaluations
for the propositional variables P , Q and R. The numbers in the columns of
d(., K1), d(., K2) and d(., K3) are the Hamming distances of each Ki from
the correspondent interpretation. Finally, in the last column is the sum of
the distances over all belief bases.
d(., K1) d(., K2) d(., K3) D
d(., K)
(1, 1, 1) 0 2 2 4
(1, 0, 0) 2 2 0 4
(0, 1, 0) 2 0 2 4
(0, 0, 0) 3 1 1 5
Thus, ∆d,ΣIC (K) = form (min([IC],6K)) = form({(1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)}) =
K1 ∨K2 ∨K3. Any of the individual judgment set is of minimal distance to
the profile of judgments. The result is that the application of the merging
operator ∆d,ΣIC allows to avoid the paradox and to obtain a tie instead.
6Early references to this operator include (Lin and Mendelzon 1999) and (Revesz 1997).
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5 Some links with distance-based approaches
in social choice theory
The use of distances establishes a close link between belief merging and so-
cial choice theory.7 As the original Condorcet paradox can be expressed in a
similar way as the doctrinal paradox (see Section 3), it comes as no wonder
that it can also be dealt with the help of the same distance-based merg-
ing operator ∆d,ΣIC . Computation of the distance between the evaluations
for preference judgments (corresponding to linear orders) and the profile of
preference judgment sets in our example yields the following:
d(., K1) d(., K2) d(., K3) D
d(., K)
a1 0 4 4 8
a2 4 0 4 8
a3 4 4 0 8
a4 2 6 2 10
a5 6 2 2 10
a6 2 2 6 10
Thus, ∆d,ΣP (K) = form (min([P ],6K)) = form({a1, a2, a3}) = K1 ∨
K2 ∨K3. Any of the individual preferences in our example of the Condorcet
paradox is of minimal distance to the profile of preference judgment sets such
that the application of the merging operator ∆d,Σ dissolves the paradox at
the price of indecision.
On the one hand typical social choice problems can be dealt with a
distance-based merging operator like the merging operator ∆d,Σ. On the
other hand ∆d,Σ can be shown to be equivalent to a widely known distance-
based social aggregation rule, Kemeny’s rule (for the following, see Eckert
and Mitlo¨hner 2005). This rule operates with the minimization of a distance
function which is based on the symmetric difference between two binary re-
lations considered as sets of ordered pairs of alternatives.
Definition 1 Consider the set L(X) of all linear orders on some finite set
X of alternatives. Define for any L,L′ ∈ L(X) the distance dK(L,L′) =
|L\L′ ∪ L′\L| as the cardinality of the symmetric difference between the two
linear orders. For every profile L = (L1, L2, ..., Ln) ∈ L(X)n the Kemeny
ranking 6KL on L(X) is defined by L′ 6KL L′′ if and only if
∑
i
dK(L
′, Li) ≤
7For a survey on distance-based approaches in social choice theory and recent applica-
tions see Baigent (2005) and Klamler (2005).
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∑
i
dK(L
′′, Li). Then the (set valued) aggregation rule f : L(X)n → L(X) is
Kemeny’s rule if for every L ∈ L(X)n f(L) = min(L(X),6KL ).
Proposition 2 For the above preference aggregation problem, the belief merg-
ing operator ∆d,Σ is equivalent to Kemeny’s rule.
Proof. Consider the mapping c : L(X) → K, which associates with every
linear order L ∈ L(X) the complete preference judgment set K ∈ K such
that, for all x, y ∈ X, x > y ∈ K if and only if (x, y) ∈ L. It is easily
verified that for any liner orders L,L′ ∈ L(X) with corresponding preference
judgment sets K and K ′ and any atomic preference judgment x > y, ωK(x >
y) 6= ωK′(x > y) if and only if (x, y) ∈ L\L′ ∪ L′\L. Thus, the mapping
c : L(X)→ K induces, for every profile of linear preference orders L ∈ L(X)n
and every profile of preference states K = (c(L1), c(L2), ..., c(Ln)) ∈ Kn, an
order-embedding from
(
L(X),6KL
)
into (K,6K).
This equivalence of the belief merging operator ∆d,Σ with Kemeny’s rule
allows to apply characterization results of the latter to the evaluation of the
former. The well-known fact (Young and Levenglick 1978) that Kemeny’s
rule is the only preference aggregation rule that is neutral, consistent and
satisfies the Condorcet property8, might in particular be adduced as a justifi-
cation for the use of the belief merging operator ∆d,Σ when order information
is involved.
Distance-based approaches do not only allow to construct merging oper-
ators and aggregation rules with certain properties, they can also be used to
justify these rules as approximate implementations of some universally ac-
knowledged principles (like the unanimity principle). The merging operator
∆d,Σ is a good example.
In the case of the aggregation of binary evaluations there is an obvious
consistency between majority voting and distance minimization which has
been observed in several contexts (see e.g. Brams et al. 2004) and can be
generalized to the following folk theorem.
Theorem 3 Majority voting minimizes the sum of Hamming distances for
the aggregation of binary evaluations.
Two corollaries immediately follow from this theorem:
8A preference aggregation rule satisfies the Condorcet property if, whenever an alter-
native x defeats another alternative y in pairwise majority voting, it can never be the case
in the social preference that y is ranked immediately above x.
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Corollary: Propositionwise majority voting is the only judgment aggre-
gation rule which satisfies anonymity, neutrality and strict monotonicity.
Corollary: Propositionwise majority voting is strategyproof.
The first corollary is an application of May’s (1952) classical theorem on
majority voting in the case of two alternatives to the similar case of the binary
evaluation of propositions. The second corollary establishes the absence of
any incentive for the agents to misreport their true evaluations and is a direct
implication of the strict monotonicity of propositionswise majority voting.
The positive significance of this theorem is however limited as the discur-
sive dilemma and the discursive version of the Condorcet paradox show that
majority voting can lead to inconsistent judgment sets if the judgments are
not logically independent, which preference judgments cannot be if conditions
like transitivity are imposed.
When an aggregation rule does not satisfy a desirable property on a subset
of the domain, an obvious escape route is the relaxation of the universal
domain condition (see Gaertner 2001). Distance-based approaches can now
help to compensate for the relaxation of the universal domain condition, by
extending a restricted aggregation rule to a mapping defined on the whole
domain.
Let f : Kn ⊃ K∗ → KIC denote an aggregation rule defined on a subset
of the profiles, which assigns to every element of the restricted domain an
outcome satisfying an integrity constraint. Then this aggregation rule can
be extended to the whole domain by constructing a new aggregation rule
F : Kn → KIC , based on a distance D : Kn ×Kn → R+ such that, for every
K ∈ Kn and all K∗ ∈ K∗, F (K) = f(argminD(K∗, K)).
A candidate for such a restricted aggregation rule with metric extension
would be any mapping f : Kn ⊃ K∗ → KIC which incorporates a universally
accepted principle of social choice. An example of such a principle is the
principle of unanimity, which requires that each unanimous profile of belief
bases K = (K ′, K ′, ..., K ′) be associated the corresponding belief base K ′.
In the case of preference aggregation it is easily seen that Kemeny’s rule
and hence the belief merging operator ∆d,Σ can be reconstructed as a metric
extension of the principle of unanimity: Kemeny’s rule assigns to each profile
of preference judgment sets the social preference that would be assigned to
the closest unanimous profile according to the unanimity principle.
The search for such metric extensions of principles of social choice might
appear as an attractive escape route as it seems to extend in an “approx-
imative” way the appeal of such a principle to an aggregation rule defined
on the whole domain. In the literature on distance-based social choice there
exists however a result that may be considered as a caveat for this type of
approximation strategy: Baigent (1987) (see also Baigent and Eckert, 2004)
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shows that there does not exist a social aggregation rule that satisfies typ-
ical properties in the spirit of the Arrovian conditions of non-dictatorship
and Pareto together with a condition of proximity preservation, essentially
requiring that smaller changes in profiles should not lead to larger changes
in the social outcome (than larger changes). This result immediately implies
that the proximity between profiles on which the metric extension is based
cannot be preserved by any “reasonable” aggregation rule.
Thus, further research is required to weigh the benefits and shortcomings
of distance-based approaches both in belief merging and in social choice.
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